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U ovom radu autori ispituju različite načine sprječavanja i borbe protiv korupcije u 
nekoliko pravnih sustava. Također daju informacije o međunarodnim instrumentima s 
kojima su usklađene unutarnje politike i zakonodavstva država. Razmatrajući dva velika 
pravna sustava Europsku uniju i SAD, autori daju uvid u dva načina borbe protiv ko-
rupcije. Premda ne postoji određena razlika u zakonodavnom pristupu Europske unije 
s jedne strane i SAD-a i Kanade s druge strane, postoje razlike u praksi. Razlike su na 
operativnom i institucionalnom nivou, ali ne i u javnim politikama. Posebna je pozornost 
u ovome članku poklonjena pravnim osobama kao nositeljima kaznene odgovornosti što 
je posljedica  različitih teoretskih pristupa prihvaćenih u određenim sustavima pod kojima 
se pravna osoba smatra kazneno odgovornom. Dok je u SAD-u vrlo lako proglasiti pravnu 
osobu kazneno odgovornom, u Velikoj Britaniji, Kanadi i nekim drugim zemljama Europ-
ske unije to je povezano s određivanjem odgovorne osobe na višim razinama u strukturi 
pravnih osoba.
Ključne riječi: korupcija, međunarodni pravni instrumenti, kaznena odgovornost prav-
nih osoba, korupcija kod pravnih osoba
Introduction
Corruption is a serious economic, social, political and moral problem. It is becoming 
an international phenomenon in scope, substance and consequences and that is why 
there has been a growth of international efforts to tackle the problem of corruption.
Economic consequences of corruption are well known: it discourages productive inve-
stments, especially foreign; it leads to inefﬁ cient use of resources; it erodes the standard 
of living; it destabilizes national budgets; makes the tax system less efﬁ cient.1 The social 
and political effects of corruption are also warning: it undermines the rule of law and 
1 According to World Bank reports, more than 1 trillion US$ is paid in bribes a year, available at http://web.
worldbank.org, 20.1.2011. According to Asian Development Bank reports, costs of corruption up to 17% GDP, 
available at http://beta.adb.org/documents/series/adb-annual-reports, 20.1.2011.
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democracy and distorts the public perception of the role of law in the society; corruption 
threatens fundamental human rights, as well as subverts the institutions that guarantee 
stability, security, and sustainable development. Drug trafﬁ cking, human trafﬁ cking and 
terrorist activities are among the most threatening activities causing trouble to corrupt 
countries. One of many examples of this can be seen in West Africa where security insti-
tutions of fragile states like Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone are hampered 
by corruption making their borders easily penetrable by cocaine trafﬁ ckers and the like, 
threatening thus the security of the entire region.
The main development typical for the period from the 90’s onwards is economic glo-
balization. Countries, i.e. economies have become more and more interdependent. This 
process, in part facilitated by technological and design developments, led to increasing 
power of multinational corporations that were able to thrive in a world with fading borders. 
It was noted that globalization led to a larger amount of corruption, since competition for 
proﬁ table contracts has risen.2 This is particularly true in the context of Central and Ea-
stern Europe after the end of the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, democracy spread and societies became more open. But it is during 
this period that corruption was widespread in this region. Corporations thus encountered 
widespread corruption and both companies and governments became aware of its costs 
and distortive effects. Also related to the end of the Cold War is the diminished incentive 
for the governments to sponsor corrupt dictators in developing countries, such as those 
in Africa. Another factor that contributed to the rise of anti-corruption regime was the 
sentiments of the general public due to a number of corruption scandals that took place 
in several Western European countries. Furthermore, it has been noted that the character 
of the present anti-corruption regime is more normative (based upon harmonized beha-
vior) than moral (based upon intrinsic commitment to shared values). 3
Apparently, the legal regimes within countries have not been able to curb corruption 
in an efﬁ cient manner. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the legal initiatives that were 
taken at the international level especially at the level of European Union, an economic and 
political union of 27 member states and the United States of America considering their 
signiﬁ cance in international relations.  
Over the last years, as the connection between corruption and security has become 
increasingly clear, the international community has slowly started to respond. The deva-
stating effect of corruption on global security emphasizes the importance and urgency of 
anticorruption efforts. Fighting corruption requires not only national, but also regional and 
international strategies rooted in global cooperation.   
United States of America
Prior to mid-nineties, no international or regional legal instruments existed on the 
topic of corruption. Corruption was primarily seen as an issue of domestic rather than 
international concern. Therefore, most countries did have national legislation prohibiting 
certain corrupt acts within their territories, particularly the bribery of domestic public ofﬁ -
cials. Legislation which prohibits the active bribery of foreign public ofﬁ cials was lacking. 
2 George, Barbara Crutchﬁ eld, Lacey, Kathleen A., A Coalition of Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, 
Multilateral Development Banks and Non-Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current 
Anti-Corruption Initiatives, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2000., p. 547., available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431269, 13.2.2011.
3 Windsor, Duane, Getz, Kathleen A., Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Corruption: Normative Regimes Despite 
Mixed Motives and Diverse Values; 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 731, 2000, p. 752. 
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The only exception was the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)4 which 
came into existence in 1977 in the wake of the Lockheed scandal5 and a report from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1976. This report revealed that questionable 
or illegal payments to foreign ofﬁ cials and politicians were a widespread phenomenon 
in the US corporate sector and included companies from chemical, aerospace and oil 
and gas sectors.6 The Act aims to prevent active bribery of foreign public ofﬁ cials by US 
corporations and citizens. To this end, the FCPA contains both anti-bribery provisions 
and accounting and recordkeeping provisions. Violators of the FCPA provisions can face 
criminal and civil penalties. For each violation of the anti-bribery provisions, corporations 
and other business entities risk criminal ﬁ nes to $2 million, as well as a civil penalty up to 
$10,000. Individuals are subject to criminal ﬁ nes up to $100,000 and/or a prison sentence 
with a maximum of 5 years. They are also subject to a civil penalty up to $10,000.7
The misconduct of well-known corporations such as Lockheed, Exxon, Gulf Oil and 
Mobil Oil received large media coverage and led to public outcry. The FCPA aimed to re-
store the conﬁ dence of both the American public and foreign relations in US businesses. 
Moreover, scandals of US corporations involved in bribery of ofﬁ cials in foreign states 
could endanger the relations with these states. US trade interests were important. Bribery 
was seen as a barrier to trade and it distorts competition by favoring the corporation that 
is willing to provide the largest bribe. However, FCPA has received several critics, parti-
cularly from the business side. Some authors emphasized that it had led to a competitive 
disadvantage of US corporations since they were not allowed to pay bribes abroad, while 
non-US corporations were not hindered to do so by any law. This gives us reason to think 
that uniﬁ cation or at least harmonization of anti-bribery laws would be an important step 
for social and economic development, since less bribery is inducing stronger competition 
and its pertaining microeconomics effects.8
Enforcement of the FCPA is in the hands of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The DOJ takes care of all criminal en-
forcement, while civil enforcement is divided between the DOJ and SEC. The SEC has 
civil enforcement authority over issuers, their ofﬁ cers, directors, employees, agents and 
stockholders acting on their behalf. The DOJ has competence over all other civil enfor-
cement.
Nowadays, there is a trend towards more aggressive investigations and enforcement 
proceedings by the DOJ and the SEC. The number of proceedings targeting individuals 
has risen as well. Moreover, punishment has become more severe. For example, in April 
2007, the oilﬁ eld services company, Barker Hughes agreed to pay US $44 million, the 
largest FCPA ﬁ ne ever.9
The next example considering US efforts in combating corruption to be mentioned 
is its participation in Organization of American States. To quote Secretary General, J.M. 
Insulza:  „We must understand that crime is no longer a single country phenomenon. It 
4 Available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/, 13.2.2011.
5 The US Company, Lockheed, had made illegal payments to government ofﬁ cials in various countries (includ-
ing Japan, Netherlands, Italy) to secure contracts for the sale of aeroplanes. The Lockheed scandal in Japan 
resulted in the prosecution of various ofﬁ cials including Kakuei Tanaka (Prime Minister in ofﬁ ce from 1972-74). 
In the Netherlands Prince Bernhardt resigned when inquiries into allegations that he had received $1 million 
from Lockheed were initiated. For more on this see Markovits A.S. & M. Silverstein 'The Politics of Scandal' 
(Holmes &Meier: New York, 1988); Mitchell, R. H. Political Bribery in Japan (University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 
1996).
6 Carr, Indira, Outhwaite, Opi, The OECD Anty-Bribery Convention Ten Years On, available at http://epubs.surrey.
ac.uk/578/1/fulltext.pdf, p.32., 10.11.2010.
7 FCPA, (G) Penalties.
8 Op. cit. at 5, p. 6.
9 See http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1186089409370, 27.2.2011.
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is a transnational problem and its magnitude is increasing on continental scale“.10  Par-
ticipation in different organizations is very important if we confess corruption is global 
phenomenon not only in its scope, but also in its consequences. An important legal in-
strument designed to address corruption is the Inter-American Convention against Cor-
ruption (IACAC)11, which was adopted on 29 March 1996 and entered into force on 6 
March 1997. This Convention does not provide a deﬁ nition of corruption but it refers to 
certain ‘acts of corruption’ in the public sector. First, the Convention contains a wide list 
of preventive measures such as adoption of conduct for public ofﬁ cials and enforcement 
mechanisms,12 instructions to government personnel,13 registration and disclosure of the 
income of public ofﬁ cials14 and many others. Although the list of preventive measures is 
extensive, the adoption is optional for State parties, since they merely have to ‘consider’ 
their applicability.15 Secondly, the IACAC obliges State Parties to criminalize certain ‘acts 
of corruption’. This Convention separates three groups of corrupt offences, to which a 
different level of obligation applies. Third, the instrument contains provisions in respect of 
cooperation and post-corruption measures. The Convention contains a provision on ex-
tradition.16 Also, States have to afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistan-
ce in the investigation and prosecution, as well as technical cooperation in prevention, 
detection, investigation and punishment of acts of corruption.17
Although the IACAC itself does not provide a monitoring mechanism, a Follow-up 
Mechanism MESICIC (MESICIC is the acronym of its Spanish name)18 was established in 
2001. The Follow-up Mechanism consists of a process of peer review, the main structure 
of which is contained in the Report of Buenos Aires.19 It is composed of two bodies: the 
Conference of State Parties and the Committee of Experts. The purposes of the Follow-up 
Mechanism are the promotion of the implementation of IACAC, the follow-up of commit-
ments of the State Parties and the study of their implementation and the facilitation of 
technical cooperation.
It is difﬁ cult to determine precisely how effective the IACAC has been in combating 
corruption in the State Parties. A study conducted by Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica and 
Trinidad & Tobago seems to indicate that although the Convention has led to adoption of 
new anti-corruption legislation in these countries, this has neither led to an improvement 
in corruption perception (as measured by CPI), nor to a lower level of corruption risks.20
A very sensitive area that is always subject to loud debates is the ﬁ nancing of cam-
paigns which is closely linked to the question of corruption in politics. The United States 
Supreme Court has been quite active and sometimes bitterly divided. Some authors ar-
gue that trends in public perception of corruption may have little with campaign ﬁ nance 
system, they emphasize that the campaign ﬁ nance system contributes to corruption in 
10 See http://wmoas.shss.cofc.edu/2010_white_paper.pdf, 18.1.1011.
11 Available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html, 27.2.2011.
12 Article III (1) and (2) IACAC.
13 Article III (3) IACAC.
14 Article III (4) IACAC.
15 Altamirano, Giorleny, D., The Impact of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, The University of Miami 
Inter-American Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2007., p. 487. -547., published by Joe Christensen, Inc., available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40176742, p. 490., 17.1.2011.
16 Article XIII IACAC.
17 Article XIV IACAC.
18 Mechanismo de Seguimiento de la Implementación de la Convención Interamericana contra la Corrupción.
19 Organization of American States, Report of Buenos Aires on the Mechanism for Follow-up on the implementation 
of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, May 2001, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/en-
glish/doc_buenos_aires_en.pdf, 17.11.2010.
20 Altamirano, Giorleny D., The impact of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, The University of 
Miami Inter-American Law Review, 2007., 38 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 487, p. 541.
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government.21 The court’s majority in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
January 2010, swept aside a century old doctrine in election law, ruling that the campaign 
ﬁ nance restriction violated the First Amendment’s free speech principles. It is an extraor-
dinary decision ruled that the government may not ban political spending by corporations 
in candidate elections. 22 This ruling overruled two precedents: Austin v. Michigan Cham-
ber of Commerce, a 1990 decision that upheld restrictions on corporate spending to 
support or oppose political candidates and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 
a 2003 decision that upheld the part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
that restricted campaign spending by corporations and unions. The ruling represented a 
sharp doctrinal shift and it will have major political and practical consequences.23 Critics 
of the court’s decision say that deep pocket interests, for example the oil, electricity, 
and telecommunication businesses have been given a dangerous level of infl uence over 
election outcomes. Lawrence Lessig, a professor of law at Harvard Law School thinks 
that the point is that the political system should be the one that people can trust, that the 
decisions Congress makes are decisions based on the merits on what makes sense or 
what people want and not what the funders demand. He emphasized that there should 
be a system that does not lead people think that money rather than sense is producing a 
political decision.24 On the other side, it is obvious that reformers have tried hard to take 
money out of politics, to protect democracy from the corrupting infl uence of money, but 
money has not been taken out of politics because donors simply ﬁ nd new, less transpa-
rent ways of infl uencing the politics. 
Another issue closely tied to corruption is lobbying with the arising question of insti-
tutional corruption. This is often explained as some kind of infl uence that has a certain 
effect: it weakens the effectiveness of an institution; it weakens especially the public trust 
of an institution. According to Robert G. Kaiser in his book So damn much Money- the 
triumph of lobbying and the corrosion of American Government,25 the American Govern-
ment has changed a lot, especially when talking about lobbying which he describes as a 
certain kind of ‘economy’ inside Washington. They support their political campaigns and 
all indicators reveal that the cost of campaign has arisen extremely so Members became 
even more dependent on those who pay. Kaiser says: „Money has been part of American 
politics forever- in the Gilded Age or the Harding administration for example- much more 
blatantly than recently…But the scale of it has just gotten way out of hand...the money 
may have come in brown paper bags in earlier eras, but the politicians needed, and took 
much less of it than they take trough much more formal channels today“.26 Kaiser also 
stressed that Members of the Congress are focused on their lives after their mandate. The 
pattern that he describes could be shown through some examples. John Campbell is a 
Congressman from California; he is a landlord to 6 used car dealers from whom he gets 
$600,000 to $6,000,000 a year, they also ﬁ nancially supported his campaign with more 
than $170,000. It was very interesting when he introduced the amendment for Consumer 
21 Persily, Nathaniel, Lammie, Kelli, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Deter-
mines Constitutional Law, 2004., U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 04-22; U of Penn Law School, 
Public Law Working Paper 53., available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=595721 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.59572, 
p. 13., 3.1.2011.
22 Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Jackson, Robert J., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides? (September 1, 2010). 
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 124, pp. 83-117, 2010.; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 676. Avail-
able at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670085.
23 Ibid. p. 116.
24 See http://bostonreview.net/BR35.5/lessig.php, 17.12.2010.
25 Kaiser, Robert, So damn much Money- the Triumph of lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government, 
First vintage books edition, 2010. 
26 Ibid. p.23.
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Financial Protection Agency Act27 of 2009 that would exclude car dealerships from over-
sight as outlined in the bill - including six tenants that paid Campbell between $600,000 
and $6 million in rent, according to the congressman’s own personal ﬁ nancial disclosure 
forms. As Kaiser mentions in his book: „In earlier generations enterprising young men 
came to Washington looking for power and political adventure, often with ambitious to 
save or reform the country or the world...in the last fourth of the twentieth century such 
aspirations were supplanted by another familiar American yearning: to get rich“.28 
A criticism has always been essential prerequisite for development. In the US the 
problem of corruption is not under the veil of secret. It is a well known phenomenon and a 
lot has been done upon this issue. Corruption Perception Index indicates that USA is on 
the 22nd place.29 As it was previously mentioned, corruption is a problem that should be 
monitored on an international level and according to that, most efforts should be taken on 
that level, but always starting from individuals. The problem is when corruptive behavior 
becomes a routine and then it is no longer only a political or economic question but rather 
a moral one.  
The European Union
The end of the Cold War resulted in the opening of borders, and especially the creation 
of a Single European Market within the European Union (EU). It has created many positive 
economic and political beneﬁ ts across Europe. However, these same processes have 
increased opportunities for organized crime and its international expansion. A new term, 
‘transnational organized crime’ has been created to describe this new phenomenon: 
„With relation to the development of crime, transnational and organized become two 
corresponding concepts: the transnational development of crime requires organization 
in order to face the difﬁ culties related to cross-border action and criminal organizations 
move transnationally as part of their development in order to maximize opportunities and 
minimize the risk of being caught and disrupted“. 30
The European Union’s ﬁ rst and most important task, ever since its establishment in the 
1950’s, has been to safeguard competition and ensure open and free markets for goods, 
services, people and capital. It is clear from any angle that the phenomenon of corruption 
is in contradiction to main EU principles. Corruption is contrary to the proper functioning 
of the internal market, it damages the ﬁ nancial interests of the European Communities 
and it also damages internal trade. It is contrary to good governance and the rule of law, 
established as foundations of the Union in the Treaty of Maastricht. Although it has taken 
time for the EU institutions to react, they have been active in certain ﬁ elds, especially 
when it comes to the protection of ﬁ nancial interests of Member States. Legislative efforts 
against corruption in European Union are aimed at reducing all forms of corruption, at 
every level, not only in EU countries and institutions, but also outside the EU.
27 Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA) takes certain consumer regulatory responsibilities of ﬁ nancial 
products from seven other agencies and centralizes it in one ofﬁ ce. It has the authority and accountability to 
supervise, examine and enforce consumer ﬁ nancial protection laws. The idea for a CFPA was spoken out by 
Elisabeth Warren, who holds the position of the Chair of Congressional Oversight Panel overseeing the US 
banking bailout. Today CFPA is in place and is also led by the same Professor Warren. 
28 Op. cit. Kaiser, 24., p.48.
29 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/26/us-corruption-transparency-idUSTRE69P0X620101026, 
17.2.2011.
30 Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst, Bernardo Mariani: Organised crime, corruption and illicit arms trafﬁ cking in an enlarged 
EU (December 2001), available at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Organised%20crime.pdf, 
p.7., 4.1.2011.
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The EU has produced many documents on ﬁ ghting corruption. Firstly, Article 29 of 
the Treaty on European Union31 which mentions preventing and combating corruption 
as one of the ways of achieving the objective of creating and maintaining an European 
area of freedom, security and justice. In 1997 the action programme on organized crime 
was established based on preventive measures. The Council’s Vienna Action Plan32 and 
the Tampere European Council in 199933 also identiﬁ ed corruption as an important area. 
The EU has also established its own instruments to tackle corruption: the two conven-
tions on the protection of the European Communities’ ﬁ nancial interests and the ﬁ ght 
against corruption involving ofﬁ cials of the European Communities or ofﬁ cials of the EU 
Member States. Since corruption is often an integral part of organized crime and mo-
stly transnational in nature, from the aforementioned legislative work and action plans, it 
appears that efforts in curbing corruption at a national level are inadequate. Communi-
cation from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on a comprehensive EU policy against corruption was 
enforced in 2003.34 The Communication adopts the deﬁ nition of corruption used by the 
United Nations’ Global Programme against Corruption35 and in its conclusion it sets out 
the principle elements of a future EU anti-corruption policy. We mention only a few: „the 
implementation of existing anti-corruption instruments should be closely monitored and 
strengthened. The Commission recommends that the European Community should adhe-
re to the Council of Europe’s conventions on corruption and participate in its monito-
ring mechanism, GRECO (Group of States against Corruption). The Communication also 
points out the need to develop an anti-corruption culture in the EU institutions; it reviews 
the steps taken by the Commission in this ﬁ eld, particularly the creation of the European 
Anti-Fraud Ofﬁ ce (OLAF) which was established in 1999 and it combats fraud and other 
illegal activities which are harmful to the Community’s interests. It has independent inve-
stigative powers. The EU special report on the work of OLAF was very critical based on 
the argument that it had no standard system under which proceedings were opened, pur-
sued and concluded. It also refers to the guide to sound ﬁ nancial management and other 
internal measures taken by the Commission.36 The next important issue according to the 
Communication is police and judicial cooperation and there have been several advances. 
EUROJUST is the judicial cooperation network that was set up in 2002 and it deals with 
fraud, corruption and money laundering. It helps Member States when they are dealing 
with serious cross-border crime.
31 Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens 
with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among 
the Member States in the ﬁ elds of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and 
combating racism and xenophobia.
 That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in particular 
terrorism, trafﬁ cking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafﬁ cking and illicit arms trafﬁ cking, 
corruption and fraud, through:
 - closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities in the Member 
States, both directly and through the European Police Ofﬁ ce (Europol), in accordance with the provisions of 
Articles 30 and 32,
 - closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States including coopera-
tion through the European Judicial Cooperation Unit ("Eurojust"), in accordance with the provisions of Articles 
31 and 32,
 - approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the Member States, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 31(e).
32 Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l33080_en.htm, 17.2.2011.
33 Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, 17.2.2011.
34 Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ﬁ ght_against_fraud/ﬁ ght_against_corruption/l33301_en.htm, 
17.2.2011.
35 Abuse of power for private gain.
36 See http://europe.bg/upload/docs/OLAF_report.pdf, 3.2.2011.
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The Commission suggested appointing a European Financial Prosecutor to deal with 
corruption affecting the ﬁ nancial interests of the Community. The Framework Decision on 
the European Arrest Warrant, applicable since 1 January 2004 is the key factor in the ﬁ ght 
against corruption because it makes it easier for offenders to surrender to the judicial 
authorities of the requesting State. The second Money Laundering Directive adopted in 
200137 classiﬁ es corruption as a serious offence and thus increases the obligations on the 
Member States to tackle it.
The other EU instrument in the battle against corruption is Convention on the Fi-
ght Against Corruption Involving Ofﬁ cial of the European Communities or Ofﬁ cials of EU 
Member States38 which was adopted in 1997 and entered into force on 27 September 
2005. This Convention deals with corruption involving EU ofﬁ cials or national ofﬁ cials 
of Member States of the EU. Corruption is only deﬁ ned in terms of active and passive 
bribery which is a quite limited approach. Each Member State must take measures to 
ensure that a conduct consisting of an act of passive or active corruption by ofﬁ cials is a 
punishable criminal offence. Furthermore, judicial cooperation is an important element of 
the Convention. In case ofﬁ cials are involved in active or passive corruption which con-
cerns at least two Member States, those States have to cooperate in an efﬁ cient manner 
in the investigation, prosecution and enforcement of the penalties. This Convention is a 
positive development in tackling corruption involving ofﬁ cials, but it is left to the judicial 
system of Member States to prosecute corrupt public ofﬁ cials. There is no speciﬁ c mo-
nitoring mechanism attached to the Convention, but the European Court of Justice has 
the competence to interpret the Convention and the rule in disputes which may arise.39 
The most recently expressed program is the Stockholm Programme.40 It is a ﬁ ve-year 
plan for deepening the cooperation in the ﬁ eld of justice and home affairs and it contains 
clear indications as to what the Commission should deliver in the ﬁ eld of anti-corruption 
measures. 
However, some key problems were detected: despite the existing EU legislation and 
monitoring mechanisms corruption remains a serious problem in the EU. Levels and for-
ms of corruption vary from one country to another but the conclusion is that there is no 
corruption free zone in Europe. What is even worse, all evidence suggest that corruption 
is on rise or at best stagnating.41 This was also conﬁ rmed by the Commission’s 2009 Euro-
barometar survey. 42 More than 75% of interviewed Europeans stated that corruption was 
a major problem for their country. The strong connection between the organized crime 
and corruption within European Union was manifest. What is also important to stress, 
corruption carries high costs for the economy- it causes harm to the state budget and 
eventually to tax payers.43 However, the most serious problem is that anti-corruption poli-
37 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=32001
L0097&lg=EN21.2.2011.
38 Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/ﬁ ght_against_fraud/ﬁ ght_against_corruption/l33027_en.htm, 
20.1.2011.
39 Ferola, Lara, Anti Bribery Measures in the European Union: A comparison with the Italian Legal Order, Interna-
tional Journal of Legal Info, p. 527. , 2000.
40 Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/
jl0034_en.htm, 18.2.2011.
41 Transparency International's 2009 corruption index, which measures perceived levels of public-sector corrup-
tion. Eight EU members of 27 are scoring only 5 points or less. This is an indication of widespread corruption. 
The EU average is 27.
42 Available at http://www.enothe.eu/cop/docs/eurobarometer_poverty.pdf, 23.1.2011.
43 A systematic and reliable calculation of the harm caused by corruption in the EU as a whole does not exist yet 
in Italy, a 2008 report of the Court of Auditors pointed out that the total costs of corruption for citizens amount 
60 billion euro each year. A study undertaken by Transparency International in Greece indicates that the costs 
of petty corruption in the year 2009 were 787 million euro (both in the public and private sector), which is an 
increase of 39 million euro since 2008. 
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cy varies among Member States. Efforts in combating corruption should be harmonized. 
The EU Member States have developed different forms of anti-corruption measures and 
do not engage in the ﬁ ght against corruption to quite the same extent. Approaches in 
the Member States vary in several aspects: national (criminal) laws differ substantially as 
do prevention programmes, law enforcement measures, and institutional arrangements. 
Some of the national anti-corruption policies showed better results than others. Unfor-
tunately, Member States are not informed about others’ successes and failures so they 
cannot learn from each other and ﬁ nd mutual mistakes. Clearly, there is room for more 
exchange of information and best practices. What we would like to emphasize as the next 
problem is that EU and international anti-corruption legislation is not fully implemented 
in the Member States. There are proven problems in the transposition of relevant EU anti-
corruption legislation.44 It appears that the implementation quality is still under doubt, but 
also the international legal instruments against corruption are not ratiﬁ ed or applied in all 
Member States. An example is the United Nations Convention against Corruption45 which 
is the ﬁ rst truly global instrument in ﬁ ghting corruption that offers government a consi-
stent framework so that all efforts tend in the same direction. It has not yet been ratiﬁ ed 
in all EU Member States.46 Also, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania have not 
signed nor ratiﬁ ed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁ cials 
in International Business Transaction.47 It should be noticed that corruption undermines 
the conﬁ dence of citizens in public institutions and fair functioning of the market. It is 
striking that the majority of Europeans interviewed in the 2009 Eurobarometer survey sta-
ted that corruption is a problem in institutions at every level of government.48 The problem 
of corruption in EU became even more important in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania 
entered EU. The European Commission had unkind words for Bulgaria and Romania in 
reports adopted on 23 July 2008.49 Failings were highlighted in both countries’ efforts to 
ﬁ ght corruption; furthermore Bulgaria was also sharply criticized for insufﬁ cient action 
against organized crime. But questions remain over the real impact of the Commission’s 
remonstrations and the extent to which the EU can effectively pressure the two countries 
to improve their performance.  
In the Commissions view, the main problem continues to be implementation of legisla-
tion, and more importance needs to be attached to preventing, investigating, prosecuting 
and adjusting corruption cases. It calls Member States to introduce common standards 
for the collection of evidence, the conﬁ scation of the proceeds, special investigative tech-
niques and the protection of whist blowers, victims and witnesses. Since corruption is a 
polyvalent phenomenon, the strategies to combat corruption should be tailor-made con-
sidering different levels of corruption between Member States, symptoms of corruption 
and expectations in the future. It is obvious that there are no simple solutions but certain 
conditions must be in place if combating corruption is to be possible at all. Political will 
is crucial. Such political will must be embedded in a comprehensive anti-corruption stra-
tegy. 
44 2007 implementation report of the Council Framework Decision of 2003 on combating corruption in the private 
sector found that the transposition of this instrument is at an early stage among Member States.
45 Available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf, 
23.2.2011.
46 Czech Republic, Germany and Ireland.
47 Available at http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
23.2.2011.
48 80% respondents stated that there is a corruption in their local, regional and national institutions. A majority 
also have thought that there are too few criminal prosecutions to deter corruption in the Member States.
49 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm, 23.2.2011.
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The question of EU real power in ﬁ ghting corruption is maybe more important nowa-
days than ever. Recent corruption scandals50 in the EU show that there is room for more 
work in the area of anti-corruption measures. Between the members of the Court of Au-
ditors it has been alleged that EU institutions conceal the real truth about the extent of 
fraud within the EU and maybe that is the reason why EU-citizens do not have enough 
conﬁ dence in EU institutions.51 It is obvious that EU is trying to make a comprehensive 
policy against corruption, but what is not sure is its effectiveness. All conventions and 
protocols are not subject to a speciﬁ c review mechanism. The Commission aims for the 
European Community to become a Member of Group of States against Corruption, GRE-
CO, the anti-corruption mechanism of the Council of Europe. The Commission is currently 
negotiating with GRECO about overcoming legal obstacles to its accession. If GRECO 
membership will not be possible, the Commission would consider to set up a separate 
EU mutual evaluation and monitoring mechanism. It is not surprising that public expecta-
tions for more EU action in the ﬁ eld of corruption are high- 88% of citizens consulted 
requested more from the EU in the ﬁ ght against corruption, making it the most supported 
policy in area of freedom, security and justice. Currently there is no comprehensive EU 
mechanism to assess anti-corruption efforts of Member States. If we consider Member 
States, EU is still not unique in its approach, but it is trying through legislative efforts, 
different bodies and standards to minimize the corruption problem. Although the scope 
of the current instruments is relatively narrow, this might be understandable given the fact 
that other organizations within Europe such as the Council of Europe are already dealing 
with the issue and many EU Member States are party to other anti-corruption treaties. 
What is also important, European Union, by its structure is only here to help Member 
States to develop their own efﬁ cient anti-corruption strategies giving them clear direction 
they need to follow.
American vs. European approach
The European Union, as an economic and political union of twenty seven states ope-
rates through a hybrid system of supranational independent institutions and intergovern-
mentally made decisions negotiated by the member states. Corruption is a phenomenon 
that is, although in different extent, present in every country. Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index 52 in 2010 indicates that Denmark, Finland and Sweden are 
perceived as the least corrupt countries and Bulgaria and Romania have only 3.6 and 3.7 
scores on the list of 2010 Corruption Perception Index. Efﬁ ciently dealing with corruption 
problem is one of the basic prerequisites for joining the EU, but after joining, the question 
remains over the real impact of EU institutions in solving corruption problems in each 
Member State and European Union as a whole. Some say that the Lisbon Treaty, which 
came into force in 2009 made some changes because after its entry into force, Freedom, 
Security and Justice became part of the EU’s common policy and EU has extended 
powers. As it was previously mentioned, the EU gives Member States only the framework 
(Stockholm Programme) and each Member State must develop its own strategy. On one 
hand, it is reasonable since each Member State has a special situation and the corruption 
level is not the same, but they should tend to the same direction. Different international 
organizations play a signiﬁ cant role in dealing with the corruption problem. Since corrup-
tion is a polyvalent phenomenon, the approach should be also multidimensional. By this 
50 Fraud in the European Carbon Market.
51 See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_hu_exe.pdf, 2.2.2011.
52 See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results, 17.12.2010.
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we mean that measures should be taken measures on every level, starting from effective 
anticorruption strategies within each country, participation in different organizations, mo-
nitoring mechanisms and business standards. The approach of EU member states is not 
unique. An important role play different conventions such as United Nations Convention 
against Corruption which entered into force in 2005 and has become most widely accep-
ted international authority in the battle against global corruption in its eight chapters and 
71 articles. This Convention is global (by global we mean the entire scope of modes of 
corruptive behavior) in both its approach to the subject and its geographical application. 
It obliges the State Parties to implement a wide and detailed range of anti-corruption 
measures affecting their laws, institutions and practices. These measures aim to promote 
the prevention, detection and sanctioning of corruption, as well as the cooperation 
between State Parties on these matters. Although this Convention, since its entry into 
force, gained a worldwide recognition, Czech Republic, Germany and Ireland have not 
ratiﬁ ed it yet. The ﬁ ght against corruption is also emphasized as a priority for the Council 
of Europe. Considering corruption, the Council of Europe decided to approach this still 
growing problem multidisciplinary. This includes settings of European norms and standar-
ds, monitoring of compliance and capacity building offered to individual countries and 
regions through technical cooperation programme. The Council of Europe has developed 
legal instruments dealing with matters such as the criminalization of corruption in the 
public and private sectors, liability and compensation for damage caused by corruption, 
conduct of public ofﬁ cials and the ﬁ nancing of political parties. These instruments are 
aimed at improving the capacity of States to ﬁ ght corruption domestically as well as at 
international level. The monitoring of compliance with these standards is entrusted to the 
Group of States against Corruption, GRECO. The Commission aims for the European 
Community to become a Member of GRECO, but they are still negotiating. Another issue 
that should be mentioned considering non-uniﬁ ed approach to the corruption problem of 
EU member states is the other instrument dealing with corruption: it is Civil Law Conven-
tion on Corruption53 which came into force in 1999 and has received ratiﬁ cations from 34 
countries. EU member states that signed but not ratiﬁ ed this Convention are Denmark 
(signed in 1999), Germany (signed in 1999), Ireland (signed in 1999), Italy (signed in 1999), 
Luxembourg (signed in 1999), UK (signed in 2000) while Portugal did not sign nor ratify it. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) created Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁ cials in International Business Transac-
tions. EU member states that have not signed nor ratiﬁ ed this Convention so far are Cy-
prus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania. All above mentioned examples show us that 
there is still a variety in approach to the corruption problem in EU member states. It is 
possible to have non-unique approach since the founding treaties state that all member 
states are indivisibly sovereign and of equal value. In contrast to other organizations, the 
EU’s style of integration has “become a highly developed system for mutual interference 
in each other’s domestic affairs”.54 On the other side the United States of America is a 
federal constitutional republic comprising ﬁ fty states and a federal district. It is the fourth 
largest country by total area, and the third largest both by area and population. The US 
economy is the world’s largest national economy with an estimated 2009 GDP of $14.3 
trillion (24% of nominal global and 20% of global GDP at purchasing power parity).55,56 
Considering its participation in different international organizations it is important to men-
tion that the US signed in 2003 and ratiﬁ ed in 2006 the United Nations Convention again-
53 Available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=174&CL=ENG, 2.2.2011.
54 Cooper, Robert, 7 April 2002, Why we still need empire, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/
story/0,11581,680117,00.html, 28.11.2010.
55 International Monetary Fund.
56 The European Union has a larger collective economy, but is not a single nation.
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st Corruption. In addition it is also a member of Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development and signed its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Ofﬁ cials in International Business Transactions. It is not appropriate to compare US and 
EU in structure since they are too different, but what is often very interesting about EU 
and US is the question of who has the world’s biggest economy. Different sources offer 
different information. For example, according to Bernd Debusmann, the World Affairs 
columnist, EU produces an economy almost as large as the United States and China. He 
criticizes US media because of portraying EU as a region in perpetual crisis with standard 
of living lower than American’s.57 The economists Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, both 
Nobel Prize winners, also have positive outlooks for Europe. In a recent column in the 
New York Times, Krugman said that Europe is often held up as evidence that higher taxes 
for the rich and beneﬁ ts for the less well-off kill economic progress. Not so, he argued. 
The European experience demonstrates the opposite: social justice and progress can go 
hand in hand.58 As Drago Kos, the president of the Council of Europe’s GRECO said: „the 
consequences of corruption reach far beyond individuals“, and that is the reason for in-
ternational anticorruption measures.59  Since EU and United States are especially intere-
sted when it comes to the protection of their ﬁ nancial interests, international business 
standards and corporation’s culture are important area considering corruption. Multina-
tional companies because of their international characteristic have a signiﬁ cant role when 
thinking about corruption as an international phenomenon. Some authors think that the 
main problem of wrongful conduct is the corporation’s culture and the deterrence in the 
monetary ﬁ nes can only be a partial response to this problem.60 Organizational culture 
and legal standards are very important if we observe the corruption problem inside the 
companies. There is an obvious problem that many corporate managers believe that they 
need to pay bribes to conduct business in some countries. For example a KPMG survey 
found that 11% of employees working in regulatory affairs functions for their organizations 
observed others „making improper payments or bribes to foreign ofﬁ cials“61, also 44% of 
managers believed they lost contract due to bribery in the last ﬁ ve years.62 These mana-
gers are not optimistic that this situation will reverse any time soon. It is obvious that 
companies whose policies and practices fail to meet high ethical standards, or take a 
relaxed attitude to compliance with laws, are exposed to serious reputational risks. Often 
it is enough to be accused of malpractice for reputation to be damaged even if a court 
subsequently determines that they have not been involved in corrupt practices. It is of 
critical importance for a company to be able to quickly quash any unfounded allegations 
by demonstrating that it acts in a transparent manner and has in place policies and pro-
cedures designed to prevent corruption. The argument that although what they may have 
done may have been against the law or international standards, it was simply the way 
business was done in a particular country is not an acceptable excuse. Nor is it good 
enough to claim that other companies and competitors have engaged in similar practi-
ces.
57 See http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2010/02/12/who-wins-in-u-s-vs-europe-contest/, 17.2.2011.
58 See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/opinion/11krugman.html?ref=paulkrugman, 23.2.2011.
59 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/news/news(20101209)international-anti-corruption-day_EN.asp, 
12.2.2011.
60 Hess, David W., Ford, Cristie, L., Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to 
an Old Problem, Cornell International Law Journal, Forthcoming, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1029849,15.12.2010., 27.12.2010.
61 KPMG FORENSIC, INTEGRITY SURVEY 2005-2006; the survey asked employees weather they had 'personally 
seen' or had 'ﬁ rsthand knowledge' of misconduct within their organisations, available at http://legacy.bentley.
edu/cbe/documents/_KPMG_Forensic_Integrity_Survey_2005_-_2006.pdf, 14.12.2010.
62 Ibid. 14.12.2010.
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In the past years, within different international instruments against corruption the 
same standards of ethical behavior are set.63 They are not different considering private 
sector of public ofﬁ cials, but the main role in implementing those standards play mul-
tinational organizations. To make them effective it is important to understand speciﬁ c 
situation of each regulated entity and allow them to play an active role in determining 
its strategies. This approach is quite different than the situation when government sets 
deﬁ nitive rules and punishes their noncompliance because it is important to have some 
main goals that must be achieved but corporations must be directly involved in attaining 
those goals. Efforts at enforcing anti-corruption instruments will not be effective if they 
do not address the issue of standards and corporate ethical culture. Over time, the use of 
improper payments to win a contract can become corporation’s routine,64which should be 
fought against. In business sector, organizational actors treat payments of bribes solely 
as economic issues and not as legal or ethical. The main roles are played by multinational 
companies that need to adopt effective compliance programs and retain independent 
monitoring systems. It would be the case with European as well as with American com-
panies.
Specifi c issue: treating corporate corruption in Europe, United States of 
America and Canada 
One of the most critical issues in ﬁ ghting corruption on the World scale is one con-
nected with corporate corruption and corporate crime and mechanisms in which state 
can control corporate activities. We live in the World in which real power lies in the hands 
of big and powerful corporate sector and therefore real struggle is and it will be with 
those powerful entities which have “no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked”65. 
In various legal systems the ﬁ ght against corporate corruption faces different obstacles 
depending on national laws and policy issues but it is to be said that it has been detected 
as one of the most serious tasks which states’ have to perform. 
Fighting against corporate corruption can be found on the grounds of Europe, United 
States and Canada (and many other jurisdictions) but United States has more results 
in ﬁ ghting it than many others. There are several reasons for that: United States are the 
most powerful economic market in western civilization, it has very liberal approach to 
companies and its rules; the number of corporate entities there is enormous and legal 
regimes are consistent of two important mechanisms. First mechanism is in nature of 
American Corporate Criminal Law, which is in its essence derivation of Tort Law, where 
almost every action of any employee can cause prosecution of the company itself-prin-
ciple of quasi objective responsibility, and second, American system has developed to 
63 Council of Europe: Recommendation No. R (2000) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
codes of conduct for public ofﬁ cials, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/
Rec(2000)10_EN.pdf, 17.12.2010.
64 Example: subsidiaries of Schnitzer Steel made improper payments in China and South Korea form 1999-2004, 
although many of the payments were mostly in small increments from $3,000 to $15,000, over the course of those 
ﬁ ve years those payments totaled over $1.8 million. In an attempt to hide improper payments, the subsidiaries 
used schemes to disguise the payments as 'refunds' or recorded payments to government ofﬁ cials as 'sales 
commissions'. In some cases, the heads to subsidiaries used secret bank accounts to make the payments. 
The involvement of two subsidiaries, the frequency of the payments, and the attempts to disguise them over 
an extended period of time, strongly suggest that these practices had become embedded as a routine practice 
within the corporate culture.
65 Edward, First Baron Thurlow (1731.-1806.).
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some extent complicated system of safeguards: Sarbanes-Oaxley Act and Thompson 
Memorandum.66 
When topics of corporate criminal liability are presented, it is also advisable to present 
them with case(s) one can easily remember and understand. Dramatic case of Transco 
from Scotland is one of those. In 1999 gas exploded in a house in the village of Larkhall 
in Scotland which resulted with killing of 4 family members-parents and two children. 
Although everyone in Scottish Legal Circles agreed that Scots Law recognize criminal 
liability for juristic persons, at the same time no one knew what would be the right mecha-
nism for prosecuting the Company. Scottish Common Law allows prosecution of Legal 
Entities for criminal acts, but the rules of establishing the link between criminal act of 
the physical offender and corporate body are demanding and with lack of clarity. Scot-
tish courts accepted theoretical criminal liability of Transco, but in reality necessary link 
was not established. Therefore judges allowed an action against Transco on the ground 
of Health and Safety Act (UK) 1974, which actually means that Transco was prosecuted 
for misdemeanor. There are still arguments about that. Problem was connected with non 
possibility to attach criminal behavior to any of Company’s high ofﬁ cials and on that guilt 
build the corporate one. The issue here is that Scots Law needs to establish liability of one 
or many natural persons within the company and at the same time that person has to be 
a member of a management of the same. 67
What is just described here is called Identiﬁ cation Doctrine. This means that corpo-
ration can be liable only and just only when it is possible to prove responsibility and guilt 
of at least one senior ofﬁ cial of the company (CEO, member of the board, department 
director, executive etc.). This is predominant system in England and Scotland as well in 
some jurisdictions based on English Common Law. On the other hand there are many 
countries which use so-called Vicarious Doctrine in which any employee can produce 
liability of corporate entity and even so if senior members of management do not have 
any knowledge of the act. 
Parallel to this, another Doctrine evolved from the common law is called Collective 
Knowledge Doctrine which evolved from US case United States v. Bank of New England 
which basically treats companies as organisms. 68 If any of its parts are “infected” or-
ganism is “infected” too. That practically means that each employee is potential threat 
to the security of the company as a whole. This doctrine is used in United States and 
to some extent in Canada, although Canadian courts developed more balanced regime 
in approaching to corporate criminal liability which search for middle solution between 
Identiﬁ cation and Vicarious doctrine and Collective knowledge doctrine on the other side 
which is based on aggregation of factors which connect company as a complete mecha-
nism.69 To go to the case from the beginning: in US or Canada Transco could be liable for 
66 Sarbanes-Oxley Act from 2002, named after two American senators, one republican: Michael Oxley from Ohio 
and one democrat Paula Sarbanes from Maryland. By this act American legislator brought strict control of 
public companies and namely ﬁ nancial books. Intention of doing that was even bigger protection of investors 
and their investments. This law is popularly also named SOX. See more in: Green, Scott; Manager's Guide to 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, 2004. (But, unfortunately even this act did 
not prevent recent developments concerning fraud in banking and ﬁ nancial sector.) Excellent overview of the 
famous Enron case which initially caused making of SOX can be found in: Hueston, John C., Essay-Behind 
the Scenes of the Enron Trial: Creating the Decisive Moments, 44. American Crim. Law Review, 197, p. 197. et. 
seq., especially  p. 199.-200., 2007. For Thompson memorandum see supra note: 72.
67 More on this case and Scots Law: Savić, Vanja-Ivan, Application of the Theoretical Models of Criminal Liability 
of Juristic Persons in Croatian and Comparative Law (in Croatian), dissertation, Faculty of Law, Zagreb, 2011, 
p. 181. et seq.
68 Wells, Celia, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England, 
2005, p. 134.-135.
69 Ferguson, Gerry, Corruption and Corporate Criminal Liability, Seminar on New Global and Canadian Standards 
on Corruption and Bribery in Foreign Business transactions, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada 1998. and 
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criminal offence since prosecution would not ask to ﬁ nd responsible director but only an 
employee. 
Criminal liability of corporation is stretched to large extent and now it exist in almost 
all European countries and very soon it will spread on Asia and Africa. The gap between 
criminal liability of an individual and criminal behavior of the company which was caused 
by the perception that only natural persons can be criminally liable was ﬁ lled with this new 
models of attribution. 
Identifi cation Doctrine - Director
Vicarious Doctrine - Every Employee
Collective knowledge Doctrine (Aggregation) - Every Employee and “Bad” 
Structure
On the second level now we can talk about corruption and criminal liability of corpora-
tions. All those theoretical doctrines and models can be used in discussion on corruption 
and criminal liability of corporations.  Many other will talk about corruption trough pure 
criminal law. Here we want to raise the question is it true that corruption is especially ade-
quate to be treated trough criminal liability of juristic persons (legal entities or corpora-
tions)? On which levels corruption is done and what we actually perceive as a corruption? 
If we take identiﬁ cation doctrine or model as a role model, in our opinion, perception on 
the real offender and corporate body will match. It is special question would it be just to 
treat in the same way small limited liability businesses and big corporations which then 
can make big faults. 
Why we used term big faults?  Look at it in two ways: If we take that big corporation 
trough collective knowledge doctrine (if is not twin brother than is at least sister of vica-
rious liability), responsibility and therefore liability of big companies will be enormous in 
quantitative sense. On the other hand when we perceive corporate corruption we do it 
trough behavior of big corporate entities. In the minds of people, corruption of small com-
pany or business enterprise is not regarded as corruption as it is on the big scale and is 
considered as “petty crime” which have to be sanctioned but with mechanisms reserved 
for natural persons. Is it so? Economic aspect of the problem pushes us towards the per-
ception that corruption is nested in big and powerful organizations which should therefo-
re be thoroughly examined and controlled.  If so, and let’s assume that it is complete fact, 
big companies will be under double pressure: ﬁ rst they will be more exposed to attach-
ment of crime since they have more employees and secondly they will be presumed guilty 
or (at least) dangerous in advance. When one might say that small enterprises are more 
exposed it is just conditionally true. While in jurisdictions which adopt identiﬁ cation model 
it is easier to detect the responsible person in the top management since those compa-
nies have less layers, but, in them, control over employees is stronger and that means that 
in systems which adopt vicarious liability those (small) companies, on contrary, will proﬁ t. 
Also if we take collective knowledge doctrine into effect, small companies will also be in 
easier control over its work and assets and these far more vulnerable. 
What happens with big (more complex) companies in the same situation? In ﬁ st case 
it would be hard to detect company as a criminal since it would be extremely hard to 
prove responsibility of top management personnel, but in application of vicarious model 
those companies will be devastated. Therefore and once again it seems that Canadian 
model, which tend to ﬁ nd a balance between reasonable expected behavior of employees 
International Colloquium on Criminal Responsibility of Collective Legal Entities, Berlin, Germany, 1998., p. 6.-
13.
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and result of reasonable and effective control of senior and middle positioned professio-
nals look just and fair. In big companies collective knowledge doctrine produces serious 
problems for companies although that idea has moral grounds. If company wants to be 
treated as powerful and successful and also homogenous body on the market, conse-
quences are connected with its perception as (one) organism which have to be responsi-
ble for actions of its parts. Equal treatment is argued by many theoreticians.70
Reasonable question which arise here is that if we gave quasi conscience to corpo-
rations as artiﬁ cial bodies in order to make them liable for crime, are we obliged to give 
them mechanisms in which they will be able to treat themselves as persons with con-
science? That is provocation of course! In United States US legislator imposed so-called 
Thompson Memorandum which imposes obligations to companies to treat themselves 
with self-control and self-punishing mechanisms71. Basically it means that if they do not 
cooperate against themselves they risk to be ﬁ ned. Is it just?
Conslusion
Despite the large scale of international instruments for combating corruption it is still 
a serious problem. The question remains whether these measures are not efﬁ cient and 
whether available instruments are not enough due to the fact that corruption is still deve-
loping as a particular phenomenon? Solving the corruption problem requires that it must 
be attached simultaneously with a variety of approaches addressing different courses 
of the problem. Progress in ﬁ ghting corruption has been made in some areas, but much 
still needs to be done. The main challenge lies ahead, and will require enormous politi-
cal resolve, by national governments, the private sector and international bodies. Some 
country leaders and governments are serious about addressing corruption. Unfortuna-
tely, experience showed that criminals have been cooperating much better than states. 
This is why there should be a better cooperation between states and organizations. Other 
states must be viewed as partners and not competitors. EU member states have a clear 
incentive and control through EU Institutions. United States are determined in solving 
corruption problem at every level, especially when they get a severe impulse from infl uen-
tial experts in that ﬁ eld. On international scene, positive is the worldwide recognition of 
United Nations Convention against Corruption, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Ofﬁ cials in International Business Transactions and OAS Inter-American 
Convention against Corruption. Arbitrary and unfair (as perceived by some authors) enfor-
cement of legal instruments against corruption and other countries anti-corruption laws 
raise issues of fairness. As established by Tom Tayler’s work in social psychology, indivi-
duals feel less of moral obligation to follow a law that is applied unfairly; therefore a ﬁ ght 
against corruption certainly must start from individuals. Sometimes the rules of individual 
ethics are not in accordance with professional conducts. Thus, there must be a clear code 
of ethics that will indicate what is allowed. Politics will also play a signiﬁ cant role in effor-
70 Preet, Bharara, Corporations cry Uncle and their Employees cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on 
Corporate Defendants; 44 American Criminal Law Review, Georgetown University, Washington DC., 2007., p. 
53.
71 Thomspson memorandum request that company actually imposes self control with elements of self-prosecu-
tion. In order to comply with regulations, US companies have to establih mechanism for self control and form 
the tool which will give them power to detect criminal within its own structure. This system faces many critiques 
especially when using 5th Amendment is in stake. (protection from self-incrimination). For more on this it is 
highly recommended to read:  Alschuler, Albert A., Two Ways to think about the Punishment of Corporations, 
Public Law and Legal Theory Series, No.09-19, Northwestern University, Law School, Chicago, IL, 2009.
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ts against corruption because lack of domestic political will, diverse legal systems and 
varying legal standards often make it difﬁ cult to succeed this hard enough battle.  
In this article special place was given to treating corporate corruption in various legal 
jurisdictions. Criminal protection will depend on which theoretical model particular state 
wishes to build its corporate criminal responsibility. In United states this will be very close 
to objective liability and prosecution will be much easier than in systems where is neces-
sary to establish the link between the management of the company and criminal action 
like it is in the United Kingdom. On the other hand many European systems fl ow between 
identiﬁ cation and vicarious doctrines. But not to be missed, Canada is probably the most 
close to just and fair solution in which search for responsible person within the company 
stops where real powers of decisions stop as well. Still, criminal liability of juristic persons 
is one of the most complex theoretical concepts of modern law.
The answer to the question form our title is: yes, we are deﬁ nitely going the same way, 
but on slightly different roads.
Summary
In this article authors examine different ways in ﬁ ghting and treating corruption in 
various legal systems and at the same time they provide information on international 
mechanisms which follow domestic legislature and politics.  By looking into two major 
legal systems on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, authors explore area of two ways 
in ﬁ ghting corruption. Although there is not any speciﬁ c difference in determination in 
which the European States on the one hand and USA and Canada on the other, seek to 
ﬁ ght corruption, even using international instruments, there are still different practical 
approach in which particular systems operate. Differences are on the operational and 
institutional levels, but not on the policies. Special attention in this article was given to 
different approaches in treating corporate bodies as criminal offender which is connected 
to different tools in which a particular system decides if a corporation is to be treated as a 
criminal. Whereas in the USA it is very easy to put a company into a criminal category, in 
the United Kingdom, Canada and in some European states it is connected with the pos-
sibility of ﬁ nding a responsible person within the higher levels of the corporate hierarchy.
Keywords: Corruption, International Legal Instruments, Criminal Liability of Legal Per-
sons, Corporate Corruption

